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1Stealth Attacks on the Smart Grid
Ke Sun, In˜aki Esnaola, Samir M. Perlaza, and H. Vincent Poor
Abstract—Random attacks that jointly minimize the amount of
information acquired by the operator about the state of the grid
and the probability of attack detection are presented. The attacks
minimize the information acquired by the operator by minimizing
the mutual information between the observations and the state
variables describing the grid. Simultaneously, the attacker aims
to minimize the probability of attack detection by minimizing the
Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence between the distribution when
the attack is present and the distribution under normal operation.
The resulting cost function is the weighted sum of the mutual
information and the KL divergence mentioned above. The trade-
off between the probability of attack detection and the reduction
of mutual information is governed by the weighting parameter
on the KL divergence term in the cost function. The probability
of attack detection is evaluated as a function of the weighting
parameter. A sufficient condition on the weighting parameter
is given for achieving an arbitrarily small probability of attack
detection. The attack performance is numerically assessed on the
IEEE 14-Bus, 30-Bus, and 118-Bus test systems.
Index Terms—Stealth, data injection attacks, information-
theoretic security, mutual information, probability of detection
I. INTRODUCTION
THE smart grid relies on the effective integration of thepower grid and advanced communication and sensing
infrastructure. Consistency between the physical layer of the
power grid and the energy management system (EMS) in the
cyber layer facilitates an economic and reliable operation of
the power system. The 2003 North American outage caused
by an alarm system failure [1] and the 2015 Ukraine power
failure caused by the BlackEnergy virus incident [2] emphasize
the need for cybersecurity mechanisms for the power system.
However, the cybersecurity threats to which the smart grid is
exposed are not well understood yet, and therefore, practical
security solutions need to come forth as a multidisciplinary
effort combining technologies such as cryptography, machine
learning, and information-theoretic security [3].
Data injection attacks (DIAs) have emerged as a major
source of concern and exemplify the type of cybersecurity
threats that specifically target power systems [4]. DIAs ma-
nipulate the state estimation process in the EMS by altering
the measurements of the state variables without triggering the
bad data detection mechanism put in place by the operator.
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In [4], it is shown that attacks that lie in the column space
of the Jacobian measurement matrix are undetectable by
testing the residual. To decrease the number of sensors that
need to be compromised by the attacker while remaining
undetectable, the ℓ0 norm of the attack vector is used as
minimization objective yielding sparse attack in [5], [6], [7]
and [8]. The case in which sparse attacks are constructed in
a distributed setting with multiple attackers is discussed in
[9] and [10]. Estimation of the operating point is studied in
[11] using the power flow or power injection information in
an inference problem formulation. Attack detection methods
that incorporate the statistical structure of the state variables
are presented for the centralized case in [12] and for the
decentralized case in [13]. Similarly, other instances of prior
knowledge use include using load forecasts in [14], [15], and
overload mitigation based on corrective dispatch in [16].
The complex nature of the power system leads naturally
to a stochastic modelling of the state variables describing the
grid. For instance, the state variables of low voltage distri-
bution systems are well described as following a multivariate
Gaussian distribution [17]. DIAs within a Bayesian framework
with minimum mean square error estimation are studied in [18]
for the centralized case and in [19] for the distributed case.
However, the fundamental limits governing the performance
of attacks in the smart grid are not well understood yet.
Information-theoretic tools are well suited to analyze power
system by leveraging the stochastic description of the state
variables. A sensor placement strategy that accounts for the
amount of information acquired by the sensing infrastructure
is studied in [20]. Information-theoretic privacy guarantees for
smart meter users are proposed in [21], [22], [23] for memory-
less stochastic processes and in [24] for general random pro-
cesses. In [25], stealth Gaussian DIA constructions are studied
in terms of information measures that quantify the information
loss and the probability of attack detection induced by the
attack. Therein, the proposed cost function gives the same
weight to the information loss and the probability of detection
which results in the effective secrecy framework proposed by
[26] in the context of stealth communications. Stealth DIA
constructions are also studied in [5], [27] for the case in
which the detection is based on the residual and in a Bayesian
hypothesis testing framework in [28]. The approaches in [5]
and [27] consider the minimum cost of compromising the
meters and the communication substation, respectively. On the
other hand, [28] focuses on the delay between the time of
attacker launching the attack and the time of operator detecting
the attack.
In this paper, the stealth attacks in [25] are generalized by
introducing a weight parameter to the objective describing
the probability of detection, which allows the attacker to
construct attacks with arbitrarily low probability of detection.
2Operating under the assumption that the state variables are
described by a multivariate Gaussian distribution [18], [19], we
characterize the optimal Gaussian generalized stealth attacks.
Since the performance of the attacks depends on the weighting
parameter governing the probability of detection, we provide a
sufficient condition on the weighting parameter that achieves
a desired probability of attack detection. To this end, we
characterize the probability of attack detection via an upper
bound which leverages a concentration inequality in [29].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section
II, a Bayesian framework with linearized dynamics for DIA
is introduced. The generalized stealth attack construction and
performance analysis are presented in Section III. Section IV
provides the probability of detection of the generalized stealth
attack, and the concentration inequality is used to derive the
upper bound for probability of detection. Section V evaluates
the proposed attack performance on IEEE test systems. The
paper ends with conclusions in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Bayesian Framework with Linearized Dynamics
The measurement model for state estimation with linearized
dynamics is given by
Y m = HXn + Zm, (1)
where Y m ∈ Rm is a vector of random variables describing
the measurements; Xn ∈ Rn is a vector of random variables
describing the state variables; H ∈ Rm×n is the linearized
Jacobian measurement matrix which is determined by the
power network topology and the admittances of the branches;
and Zm ∈ Rm is the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)
with distribution N (0, σ2Im) that is introduced by the sensors
as a result of the thermal noise, c.f. [30] and [31]. In the
remaining of the paper, we assume that the vector of the state
variables follows a multivariate Gaussian distribution given by
Xn ∼ N (0,ΣXX), (2)
where ΣXX ∈ S
n
+ is the covariance matrix of the distribution
of the state variables and Sn+ denotes the set of positive
semidefinite matrices of size n×n. As a result of the linearized
dynamic in (1), the vector of measurements also follows a
multivariate Gaussian distribution denoted by
Y m ∼ N (0,ΣYY ), (3)
where ΣYY = HΣXXH
T + σ2Im is the covariance matrix of
the distribution of the vector of measurements.
Data injection attacks corrupt the measurements available to
the operator by adding an attack vector to the measurements.
The resulting vector of compromised measurements is given
by
Y mA = HX
n + Zm +Am, (4)
where Am ∈ Rm is the attack vector and Y mA ∈ R
m
is the
vector containing the compromised measurements [4]. Given
the stochastic nature of the state variables, it is reasonable for
the attacker to pursue a stochastic attack construction strategy.
In the following, an attack vector which is independent of
the state variables is constructed under the assumption that
the attack vector follows a multivariate Gaussian distribution
denoted by
Am ∼ N (0,ΣAA), (5)
where ΣAA ∈ S
m
+ is the covariance matrix of the attack
distribution. The rationale for choosing a Gaussian distribu-
tion for the attack vector follows from the fact that for the
measurement model in (4) the additive attack distribution that
minimizes the mutual information between the vector of state
variables and the compromised measurements is Gaussian
[32]. Because of the Gaussianity of the attack distribution,
the vector of compromised measurements is distributed as
Y mA ∼ N (0,ΣYAYA), (6)
where ΣYAYA = HΣXXH
T + σ2Im +ΣAA is the covariance
matrix of the distribution of the compromised measurements.
It is worth noting that the independence of the attack vector
with respect to the state variables implies that constructing
the attack vector does not require access to the realizations
of the state variables. In fact, knowledge of the second order
moments of the state variables and the variance of the AWGN
introduced by the measurement process suffices to construct
the attack. This assumption significantly reduces the difficulty
of the attack construction.
The operator of the power system makes use of the acquired
measurements to detect the attack. The detection problem is
cast as a hypothesis testing problem with hypotheses
H0 : Y
m ∼ N (0,ΣYY ), versus (7)
H1 : Y
m ∼ N (0,ΣYAYA). (8)
The null hypothesis H0 describes the case in which the power
system is not compromised, while the alternative hypothesis
H1 describes the case in which the power system is under
attack.
Two types of error are considered in hypothesis testing
problems, Type I error is the probability of accepting H1 when
H0 is the ground truth, i.e. a false alarm or false positive;
and Type II error is the probability of accepting H0 when
H1 is the ground truth, i.e. a true negative. The Neyman-
Pearson lemma [33, Proposition II.D.1] states that for a fixed
probability of Type I error, the likelihood ratio test (LRT)
achieves the minimum Type II error when compared with any
other test with an equal or smaller Type I error. Consequently,
the LRT is chosen to decide between H0 and H1 based on the
available measurements. The LRT between H0 and H1 takes
following form:
L(y)
∆
=
fYm
A
(y)
fYm(y)
H1
≷
H0
τ, (9)
where y ∈ Rm is a realization of the vector of random
variables modelling the measurements; fYm
A
and fYm denote
the probability density functions (p.d.f.’s) of Y mA and Y
m,
respectively; and τ is the decision threshold set by the operator
to meet a given false alarm constraint.
3B. Information-Theoretic Setting
The mutual information between two random variables is a
measure of the amount of information that each random vari-
able contains about the other random variable. Consequently,
the amount of information that the vector of measurements
contains about the vector of state variables is determined by
the mutual information between the vector of state variables
and the vector of measurements. Information measures have
previously been used to quantify the amount of information ac-
quired by different monitoring systems in a smart grid context.
For instance, in [20] mutual information is used to quantify
the amount of information obtained by phasor measurement
units from the grid. Similarly, mutual information is used to
quantify the amount of information leaked by smart meters in
[21] and [22].
The Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence between two prob-
ability distributions is a measure of the statistical difference
between the distributions. As such, it is a practical measure
to quantify the deviation of the measurement statistics with
respect to the statistics under normal operating conditions. For
instance, in [13] it is used to test abnormal behaviors on the
grid. For the hypothesis testing problem in (9), a small value
of the KL divergence between PYm
A
and PYm implies that on
average the attack is unlikely to be detected by the LRT set
by the attacker for a fixed value of τ .
The purpose of the attacker is to disrupt the normal state
estimation procedure by minimizing the information that the
operator acquires about the state variables, while guaranteeing
that the probability of attack detection is small enough, and
therefore, remain concealed in the system.
An information-theoretic framework for the attack construc-
tion is adopted in this paper. To minimize the information
that the operator acquires about the state variables from the
measurements, the attacker minimizes the mutual informa-
tion between the vector of state variables and the vector of
compromised measurements. Specifically, the attacker aims
to minimize I(Xn;Y mA ). The rationale for choosing mutual
information to measure the evidence acquired by the measure-
ments stems from the fundamental character of information-
theoretic measures. In particular, mutual information describes
the amount of information two random variables share, and
therefore, it establishes in quantitative terms how much evi-
dence the measurements contain. For that reason, it is natural
for the attacker to attempt to minimize the mutual information
with the aim of disrupting the monitoring process of the
network operator.
On the other hand, the probability of attack detection is
determined by the detection threshold τ set by the operator
and the distribution induced by the attack on the vector of
compromised measurements. An analytical expression of the
probability of attack detection can be described in closed-form
as a function of the distributions describing the measurements
under both hypotheses. However, the expression is involved
in general and it is not straightforward to incorporate it into
an analytical formulation of the attack construction. For that
reason, we instead consider the asymptotic performance of
the LRT to evaluate the detection performance of the operator.
The Chernoff-Stein lemma [34, Theorem 11.7.3] characterizes
the asymptotic exponent of the probability of detection when
the number of observations of measurement vectors grows to
infinity. In our setting, the Chernoff-Stein lemma states that
for any LRT and ǫ ∈ (0, 1/2), it holds that
lim
k→∞
1
k
log βǫk = −D(PYmA ‖PYm), (10)
where D(·‖·) is the KL divergence, βǫk is the minimum
Type II error such that the Type I error α satisfies α < ǫ,
and k is the number of m-dimensional measurement vectors
that are available for the LRT. Therefore, for the attacker,
minimizing the asymptotic detection probability is equivalent
to minimizing D(PYm
A
‖PYm), where PYm
A
and PYm denote
the probability distributions of Y mA and Y
m, respectively.
III. INFORMATION-THEORETIC ATTACK
A. Generalized Stealth Attacks
When these two information-theoretic objectives are con-
sidered by the attacker, [25] proposes an stealthy attack
construction that combines the two objectives in one cost
function, i.e.,
I(Xn;Y mA )+D(PYmA ‖PYm)=D(PXnYmA ‖PXnPYm), (11)
where PXnYm
A
is the joint distribution of Xn and Y mA . The
resulting optimization problem to construct the attack is given
by
min
Am
D(PXnYm
A
‖PXnPYm). (12)
Therein, it is shown that (12) is a convex optimization problem
and the covariance matrix of the optimal Gaussian attack is
ΣAA = HΣXXH
T. However, numerical simulations on IEEE
test system show that the attack construction proposed above
yields large values of probability of detection in practical
settings.
To address the issue of high probability of detection, in the
following we propose an attack construction strategy that tunes
the probability of detection with a parameter that weights the
detection term in the cost function. The resulting optimization
problem is given by
min
Am
I(Xn;Y mA ) + λD(PYmA ‖PYm), (13)
where λ ≥ 1 governs the weight given to each objective in the
cost function. It is interesting to note that for the case in which
λ = 1 the proposed cost function boils down to the effective
secrecy proposed in [26] and the attack construction in (13)
coincides with that in [25]. For λ > 1, the attacker adopts
a conservative approach and prioritizes remaining undetected
over minimizing the amount of information acquired by the
operator. By increasing the value of λ the attacker decreases
the probability of detection at the expense of increasing the
amount of information acquired by the operator via the mea-
surements. The case for λ < 1 requires a different treatment
and is left as future work.
4B. Optimal Attack Construction
The attack construction in (13) is formulated in a general
setting. The following propositions particularize the KL di-
vergence and mutual information to our multivariate Gaussian
setting.
Proposition 1. [34] The KL divergence between m-
dimensional multivariate Gaussian distributions N (0,ΣYAYA)
and N (0,ΣYY ) is given by
D(PYm
A
‖PYm)=
1
2
(
log
|ΣYY |
|ΣYAYA |
−m+ tr
(
Σ−1YYΣYAYA
))
. (14)
Proposition 2. [34] The mutual information between the
vectors of random variables Xn ∼ N (0,ΣXX) and Y
m
A ∼
N (0,ΣYAYA) is given by
I(Xn;Y mA ) =
1
2
log
|ΣXX ||ΣYAYA |
|Σ|
, (15)
where Σ is the covariance matrix of the joint distribution of
(Xn, Y mA ).
Substituting (14) and (15) in (13) we can now pose the
Gaussian attack construction as the following optimization
problem:
min
ΣAA∈Sm+
−(λ− 1) log |ΣYY +ΣAA| − log |ΣAA + σ
2Im|
+λtr(Σ−1YYΣAA). (16)
We now proceed to solve the optimization problem above.
First, note that the optimization domain Sm+ is a convex set.
The following proposition characterizes the convexity of the
cost function.
Proposition 3. Let λ ≥ 1. Then the cost function in the
optimization problem in (16) is convex.
Proof. Note that the term − log |ΣAA + σ
2Im| is a con-
vex function on ΣAA ∈ S
m
+ [35]. Additionally, −(λ −
1) log |ΣYY +ΣAA| is a convex function on ΣAA ∈ S
m
+ when
λ ≥ 1. Since the trace operator is a linear operator and the
sum of convex functions is convex, it follows that the cost
function in (16) is convex on ΣAA ∈ S
m
+ .
Theorem 1. Let λ ≥ 1. Then the solution to the optimization
problem in (16) is
Σ⋆AA =
1
λ
HΣXXH
T. (17)
Proof. Denote the cost function in (16) by f(ΣAA). Taking
the derivative of the cost function with respect to ΣAA yields
∂f(ΣAA)
∂ΣAA
=−2(λ− 1)(ΣYY +ΣAA)
−1−2(ΣAA + σ
2Im)
−1
+2λΣ−1YY + (λ− 1)diag
(
(ΣYY +ΣAA)
−1
)
+diag
(
(ΣAA + σ
2Im)
−1
)
− λdiag(Σ−1Y Y ). (18)
Note that the only critical point is Σ⋆AA =
1
λ
HΣXXH
T.
Theorem 1 follows immediately from combining this result
with Proposition 3.
Corollary 1. The mutual information between the vector of
state variables and the vector of compromised measurements
induced by the optimal attack construction is given by
I(Xn;Y nA )
=
1
2
log
∣∣∣∣∣HΣXXHT
(
σ2Im +
1
λ
HΣXXH
T
)−1
+ Im
∣∣∣∣∣ . (19)
Theorem 1 shows that the generalized stealth attacks share
the same structure of the stealth attacks in [25] up to a scaling
factor determined by λ. The solution in Theorem 1 holds for
the case in which λ ≥ 1, and therefore, lacks full generality.
However, the case in which λ < 1 yields unreasonably
high probability of detection [25] which indicates that the
proposed attack construction is indeed of practical interest
in a wide range of state estimation settings. Furthermore the
optimization problem in (16) results in a non-convex problem
when λ < 1 and the solution obtained above no longer holds.
For this reason the case with λ < 1 is left as a future research
question.
Changing the value of λ yields different solutions on the
Pareto front of the optimization problem in (16) as we show
in the numerical results in Section V-B. For any λ ≥ 1,
Theorem 1 guarantees that the generalized stealth attack is the
only Parento efficient solution, i.e. the attack construction that
minimizes the mutual information subject to the probability of
detection constraint being satisfied. By increasing the value of
λ the attacker places more importance on the probability of
detection than on the mutual information which results in a
more conservative attack that disrupts less but is more difficult
to detect.
Theorem 1 also shows that the resulting attack construction
is remarkably simple to implement provided that the infor-
mation about the system is available to the attacker. Indeed,
the attacker only requires access to the linearized Jacobian
measurement matrix H and the second order statistics of
the state variables, but the variance of the noise introduced
by the sensors is not necessary. To obtain the Jacobian, a
malicious attacker needs to know the topology of the grid,
the admittances of the branches, and the operation point of
the system. The second order statistics of the state variables
on the other hand, can be estimated using historical data. In
[25] it is shown that the attack construction with a sample
covariance matrix of the state variables obtained with historical
data is asymptotically optimal when the size of the training
data grows to infinity.
Corollary 1 shows that the mutual information increases
monotonically with λ and that it asymptotically converges to
I(Xn;Y m), i.e. the case in which there is no attack. While the
evaluation of the mutual information as shown in Corollary 1 is
straightforward, the computation of the associated probability
of detection yields involved expressions that do not provide
much insight. For that reason, the probability of detection of
optimal attacks is treated in the following section.
IV. PROBABILITY OF DETECTION OF GENERALIZED
STEALTH ATTACKS
The asymptotic probability of detection of the generalized
stealth attacks characterized in Section III-B is governed by
5the KL divergence as described in (10). However in the non-
asymptotic case, determining the probability of detection is
difficult, and therefore, choosing a value of λ that provides
the desired probability of detection is a challenging task. In
this section we first provide a closed-form expression of the
probability of detection by direct evaluation and show that
the expression does not provide any practical insight over the
choice of λ that achieves the desired detection performance.
That being the case, we then provide an upper bound on the
probability of detection, which, in turn, provides a lower bound
on the value of λ that achieves the desired probability of
detection.
A. Direct Evaluation of the Probability of Detection
Detection based on the LRT with threshold τ yields a
probability of detection given by
PD
∆
= E
[
1{L(YmA )≥τ}
]
, (20)
where 1{·} is the indicator function. The following proposi-
tion particularizes the above expression to the optimal attack
construction described in Section III-B.
Lemma 1. The probability of detection of the LRT in (9) for
the attack construction in (17) is given by
PD(λ)
∆
=P
[
(Up)
T
∆Up≥λ
(
2logτ+log
∣∣Ip+λ−1∆∣∣)], (21)
where p
∆
= rank(HΣXXH
T), Up ∈ Rp is a vector of
random variables with distribution N (0, Ip), and ∆ ∈
R
p×p is a diagonal matrix with entries given by (∆)i,i =
λi(HΣXXH
T)λi(Σ
−1
YY ), where λi(A) with i = 1, . . . , p
denotes the i-th eigenvalue of matrix A in descending order.
Proof. The probability of detection of the stealth attack is,
PD(λ)=
∫
S
dPYm
A
(22)
=
1
(2π)
m
2 |ΣYAYA |
1
2
∫
S
exp
{
−
1
2
yTΣ−1YAYAy
}
dy, (23)
where
S = {y ∈ Rm : L(y) ≥ τ}. (24)
Algebraic manipulation yields the following equivalent de-
scription of the integration domain:
S=
{
y ∈ Rm: yT∆0y≥2 log τ+log |Im +ΣAAΣ
−1
YY |
}
, (25)
with ∆0
∆
= Σ−1YY −Σ
−1
YAYA
. Let ΣYY = UYYΛYYU
T
YY where
ΛYY ∈ R
m×m
is a diagonal matrix containing the eigenvalues
of ΣYY in descending order and UYY ∈ R
m×m
is a unitary
matrix whose columns are the eigenvectors of ΣYY ordered
matching the order of the eigenvalues. Applying the change
of variable y1
∆
= UYY y in (23) results in
PD(λ)=
1
(2π)
m
2 |ΣYAYA |
1
2
∫
S1
exp
{
−
1
2
yT1Λ
−1
YAYA
y1
}
dy1, (26)
where ΛYAYA ∈ R
m×m
denotes the diagonal matrix contain-
ing the eigenvalues of ΣYAYA in descending order. Noticing
that ΣAA and ΣYAYA are also diagonalized by UYY , the
integration domain S1 is given by
S1=
{
y1∈R
m
: yT1∆1y1≥2 log τ+log |Im+ΛAAΛ
−1
YY |
}
, (27)
where ∆1
∆
= Λ−1YY − Λ
−1
YAYA
and ΛAA denotes the diagonal
matrix containing the eigenvalues of ΣAA in descending order.
Further applying the change of variable y2
∆
= Λ
−1
2
YAYA
y1 in (26)
results in
PD(λ) =
1√
(2π)m
∫
S2
exp{−
1
2
yT2y2}dy2, (28)
with the transformed integration domain given by
S2=
{
y2 ∈ R
m
: yT2∆2y2 ≥ 2 log τ +log |Im+∆2|
}
, (29)
with
∆2
∆
= ΛAAΛ
−1
YY . (30)
Setting ∆
∆
= λ∆2 and noticing that rank(∆) =
rank(HΣXXH
T) concludes the proof.
Lemma 1 shows that the probability of detection is equiva-
lent to the probability that a weighted sum of independent χ2
random variables exceeds a certain threshold. In our setting,
the threshold is determined by the trade-off parameter λ.
Notice that the left-hand term (Up)T∆Up in (21) is a weighted
sum of independent χ2 distributed random variables with one
degree of freedom where the weights are determined by the
diagonal entries of ∆ which depend on the second order
statistics of the state variables, the Jacobian measurement
matrix, and the variance of the noise; i.e. the attacker has no
control over this term. The right-hand side contains in addition
λ and τ , and therefore, the probability of attack detection is
described as a function of the parameter λ.
Unfortunately, no closed-form expression is available for the
distribution of a positively weighted sum of independent χ2
random variables with one degree of freedom [36]. Usually,
some moment matching approximation approaches, such as the
Lindsay–Pilla–Basak (LPB) method [37], are utilized to solve
this problem but the resulting expressions are complex and
the relation of the probability of detection with λ is difficult
to describe analytically following this course of action.
In the following an upper bound on the probability of attack
detection is derived. The upper bound is then used to provide
a simple lower bound on the value λ that achieves the desired
probability of detection.
B. Upper Bound on the Probability of Detection
The following theorem provides a sufficient condition for λ
to achieve a desired probability of attack detection.
Theorem 2. Let τ > 1 be the decision threshold of the LRT
in (9). Given t > 0 it holds that for all λ ≥ max (λ⋆(t), 1) the
probability of attack detection satisfies
PD(λ) ≤ e
−t, (31)
where λ∗(t) is the only positive solution of λ satisfying
2λ log τ −
1
2λ
tr(∆2)− 2
√
tr(∆2)t−2‖∆‖∞t = 0, (32)
6and ‖ · ‖∞ is the infinity norm.
Proof. We start with the result of Lemma 1 which gives
PD(λ)=P
[
(Up)
T
∆Up≥λ
(
2 log τ +log
∣∣Ip+λ−1∆∣∣)] . (33)
We now proceed to expand the term log
∣∣Ip + λ−1∆∣∣ using a
Taylor series expansion resulting in
log
∣∣Ip + λ−1∆∣∣
=
p∑
i=1
log
(
1 + λ−1(∆)i,i
)
(34)
=
p∑
i=1

 ∞∑
j=1
((
λ−1(∆)i,i
)2j−1
2j − 1
−
(
λ−1(∆)i,i
)2j
2j
) . (35)
Since (∆)i,i ≤ 1 for i = 1, . . . , p, and λ ≥ 1, then(
λ−1(∆)i,i
)2j−1
2j − 1
−
(
λ−1(∆)i,i
)2j
2j
≥ 0, for j ∈ Z+. (36)
Thus, (35) is lower bounded by the second order Taylor
expansion, i.e.,
log |Ip +∆| ≥
p∑
i=1
(
λ−1(∆)i,i −
(
λ−1(∆)i,i
)2
2
)
(37)
=
1
λ
tr(∆)−
1
2λ2
tr(∆2). (38)
Substituting (38) in (33) yields
PD(λ)≤P
[
(Up)
T
∆Up ≥ tr(∆)+2λ log τ −
1
2λ
tr(∆2)
]
. (39)
Note that E
[
(Up)T∆Up
]
= tr(∆), and therefore, evaluating
the probability in (39) is equivalent to evaluating the proba-
bility of (Up)T∆Up deviating 2λ log τ − 12λ tr(∆
2) from the
mean. In view of this and the results in [29] and [38], the
right-hand side in (39) is upper bounded by
PD(λ)≤P
[
(Up)
T
∆Up ≥ tr(∆)+2
√
tr(∆2)t+2||∆||∞t
]
(40)
≤ e−t, (41)
for t > 0 satisfying
2λ log τ −
1
2λ
tr(∆2) ≥ 2
√
tr(∆2)t+ 2||∆||∞t. (42)
The expression in (42) is satisfied with equality for two
values of λ, one is strictly negative and the other one is
strictly positive denoted by λ∗(t), when τ > 1. The result
follows by noticing that the left-hand term of (42) increases
monotonically for λ > 0 and choosing λ ≥ max (λ⋆(t), 1).
This concludes the proof.
It is interesting to note that for large values of λ the
probability of detection decreases exponentially fast with λ.
We will later show in the numerical results that the regime in
which the exponentially fast decrease kicks in does not align
with the saturation of the mutual information loss induced by
the attack.
V. NUMERICAL SIMULATION
In this section, we present simulations to evaluate the
performance of the proposed attack strategy in practical state
estimation settings. In particular, the IEEE 14-Bus, 30-Bus
and 118-Bus test systems are considered in the simulation.
In state estimation with linearized dynamics, the Jacobian
measurement matrix is determined by the operation point.
We assume a DC state estimation scenario [30], [31], and
thus, we set the resistances of the branches to 0 and the bus
voltage magnitude to 1.0 per unit. Note that in this setting
it is sufficient to specify the network topology, the branch
reactances, real power flow, and the power injection values to
fully characterize the system. Specifically, we use the IEEE
test system framework provided by MATPOWER [39]. We
choose the bus voltage angle to be the state variables, and use
the power injection and the power flows in both directions as
the measurements.
As stated in Section IV-A, there is no closed-form ex-
pression for the distribution of a positively weighted sum
of independent χ2 random variables, which is required to
calculate the probability of detection of the generalized stealth
attacks as shown in Lemma 1. For that reason, we use the LPB
method and the MOMENTCHI2 package [40] to numerically
evaluate the probability of attack detection.
The simulation settings are the same as in [25]. The
covariance matrix of the state variables is assumed to be a
Toeplitz matrix with exponential decay parameter ρ, where
the exponential decay parameter ρ determines the correlation
strength between different entries of the state variable vector.
The performance of the generalized stealth attack is a function
of weight given to the detection term in the attack construction
cost function, i.e. λ, the correlation strength between state
variables, i.e. ρ, and the Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) of the
power system which is defined as
SNR
∆
= 10 log10
(
tr(HΣXXH
T)
mσ2
)
. (43)
A. Generalized Stealth Attack Performance
Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 depict the performance of the optimal
attack construction given in (17) for different values of ρ
with SNR = 10 dB and SNR = 20 dB, respectively,
when λ = 2 and τ = 2. Interestingly, the performance of
the attack construction does not change monotonically with
the correlation strength, which suggests that the correlation
among the state variables does not necessarily provide an
advantage to the attacker. Admittedly, for a small and moderate
values of ρ, the performance of the attack does not change
significantly with ρ for both objectives. This effect is more
noticeable in the high SNR scenario. However, for large values
of ρ the performance of the attack improves significantly in
terms of both mutual information and probability of detection.
Moreover, the advantage provided by large values of ρ is more
significant for the 118-Bus system than for the 30-Bus system,
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Fig. 1. Performance of the generalized stealth attack in terms
of mutual information and probability of detection for different
values of ρ when λ = 2, τ = 2, and SNR = 10 dB.
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Fig. 2. Performance of the generalized stealth attack in terms
of mutual information and probability of detection for different
values of ρ when λ = 2, τ = 2, and SNR = 20 dB.
which indicates that correlation between the state variables is
easier to exploit for the attacker in large systems.
Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 depict the performance of the optimal
attack construction for different values of λ and ρ with
SNR = 10 dB and SNR = 20 dB, respectively, when τ = 2.
As expected, larger values of the parameter λ yield smaller
values of the probability of attack detection while increasing
the mutual information between the state variables vector and
the compromised measurement vector. We observe that the
probability of detection decreases approximately linearly with
respect to log λ for moderate values of λ. On the other hand,
Theorem 2 states that for large values of λ the probability of
detection decreases exponentially fast to zero. However, for the
range of values of λ in which the decrease of probability of
detection is approximately linear with respect to log λ, there
is no significant reduction on the rate of growth of mutual
information. In view of this, the attacker needs to choose
the value of λ carefully as the convergence of the mutual
information to the asymptote I(XN ;YM ) is slower than that
of the probability of detection to zero.
The comparison between the 30-Bus and 118-Bus systems
shows that for the smaller size system the probability of
detection decreases faster to zero while the rate of growth of
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Fig. 3. Performance of the generalized stealth attack in terms
of mutual information and probability of detection for different
values of λ and system size when ρ = 0.1, ρ = 0.9, SNR =
10 dB and τ = 2.
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Fig. 4. Performance of the generalized stealth attack in terms
of mutual information and probability of detection for different
values of λ and system size when ρ = 0.1, ρ = 0.9, SNR =
20 dB and τ = 2.
mutual information is smaller than that on the larger system.
This suggests that the choice of λ is particularly critical in
large size systems as smaller size systems exhibit a more
robust attack performance for different values of λ. The effect
of the correlation between the state variables is significantly
more noticeable for the 118-bus system. While there is a
performance gain for the 30-bus system in terms of both
mutual information and probability of detection due to the
high correlation between the state variables, the improvement
is more noteworthy for the 118-bus case. Remarkably, the
difference in terms of mutual information between the case
in which ρ = 0.1 and ρ = 0.9 increases as λ increases
which indicates that the cost in terms of mutual information
of reducing the probability of detection is large in the small
values of correlation.
The performance of the upper bound given by Theorem
2 on the probability of detection for different values of λ
and ρ when τ = 2 and SNR = 10 dB is shown in Fig.
5. Similarly, Fig. 6 depicts the upper bound with the same
parameters but with SNR = 20 dB. As shown by Theorem
2 the bound decreases exponentially fast for large values of
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Fig. 5. Upper bound on probability of detection given in
Theorem 2 for different values of λ when ρ = 0.1 or 0.9,
SNR = 10 dB, and τ = 2.
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Fig. 6. Upper bound on probability of detection given in
Theorem 2 for different values of λ when ρ = 0.1 or 0.9,
SNR = 20 dB, and τ = 2.
λ. Still, there is a significant gap to the probability of attack
detection evaluated numerically. This is partially due to the fact
that our bound is based on the concentration inequality in [29]
which introduces a gap of more than an order of magnitude.
Interestingly, the gap decreases when the value of ρ increases
although the change is not significant. More importantly, the
bound is tighter for lower values of SNR for both 30-bus and
118-bus systems.
B. Performance and Sensitivity under AC State Estimation
In the AC state estimation case the iterative estimation meth-
ods require a nominal operation point that is updated for each
iteration. When the attacker has the perfect information about
the operation point in each iteration, i.e. perfect information
about Jacobian matrixH in each iteration, the resulting mutual
information and probability of detection follow from Corollary
1 and Lemma 1 directly. In the following, we study the impact
of imperfect nominal operation point information on the attack
performance. In particular the generalized stealth attacks are
constructed as Am0 ∼ N (0,
1
λ
H0ΣXXH
T
0), where H0 is the
Jacobian matrix at the nominal operation point x0 and is given
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Fig. 7. Performance of generalized stealth attack in terms of
mutual information and probability of detection for different
values of σ2∆ and λ on IEEE 14-Bus system when ρ = 0.1,
τ = 2, and SNR = 20 dB. The marker represents the same
value of λ is used in the attack construction.
10-1 100
Probability of Detection
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
I
(X
N
;Y
M A
)
σ
∆
2
= 0
λ = 2→
λ = 4→
λ = 6→
λ = 8→
λ = 10→
σ
∆
2
= 0.2
σ
∆
2
= 0.4
Fig. 8. Performance of generalized stealth attack in terms of
mutual information and probability of detection for different
values of σ2∆ and λ on IEEE 30-Bus system when ρ = 0.1,
τ = 2, and SNR = 20 dB. The marker represents the same
value of λ is used in the attack construction.
by
H0 =
∂
∂(Xn)
H(Xn)|Xn=x0 , (44)
with H(Xn) ∈ Rm denoting the vector of random variables
induced by the nonlinear relation between the state variables
and the measurements. To model the imperfect knowledge of
the nominal point, the nominal linearization point is perturbed
with random variable ∆ ∼ N (0, σ2∆I) resulting in the Jaco-
bian matrix H given by
H =
∂
∂(Xn)
H(Xn)|Xn=x0+∆. (45)
Note that the introduction of this random perturbation gives
us a way to control the strength of the perturbation, i.e. the
uncertainty over the nominal linearization point, and as a
result we study the sensitivity of the attacks under AC state
estimation by changing the variance σ2∆ in the simulations.
9Fig. 7 depicts the performance of the generalized stealth
attacks in terms of the mutual information and the probability
of detection for different values of σ2∆ and λ on the IEEE
14-Bus system when ρ = 0.1, τ = 2, and SNR = 20 dB.
Similarly Fig. 8 shows the performance of the attacks under
the same setting on IEEE 30-Bus system. We generate 200
realizations of ∆ per point and for each realization of ∆
we evaluate 2000 realizations of the state variables. The
curve corresponding to the case when σ2∆ = 0 describes
the performance of the attacks with perfect knowledge of
the nominal operation point. As expected, when there is less
accurate knowledge about the nominal operation point, i.e.
σ2∆ increases, the performance of the attack A
m
0 decreases.
Interestingly the performance decrease translates in a larger
value of mutual information for all cases. However, the change
in probability of detection is not as significant, to the extent
that in some cases the probability of detection decreases. Note
that for all cases, overall the attack performance decreases
when perfect operation point is not available. Interestingly,
the stealth of the attacks is more robust for the IEEE 30-
Bus system than for the IEEE 14-Bus system, which suggests
that the attacker is better positioned to cope with system
uncertainty for larger networks.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed a novel data injection attacks based
on information-theoretic performance measures. Specifically,
we have posed the attack construction problem as an opti-
mization problem in which the cost function combines the
mutual information and the probability of attack detection. The
proposed cost function allows to obtain an arbitrarily small
probability of attack detection via a parameter that weights
the effect of the mutual information and the probability of
detection. The resulting random attack construction has been
analyzed in terms of the information loss and the probability
of attack detection that it induces on the system. We have
characterized the probability of attack detection by obtaining
an easy to compute upper bound. The upper bound has been
used to provide a practical attack construction guideline by
determining the cost function that achieves a given probability
of attack detection.
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